

THE HERITAGE AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE DIFFERENTIATED SPACE OF THE ALT-RIGHT

HERENCIAS Y CONSTRUCCIÓN DEL ESPACIO DIFERENCIADO DE LA DERECHA ALTERNATIVA

Ander Rivera Guerrero

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, España.
Anderrivera99mail.com

Imanol Telleria Herrera

Universidad del País Vasco, Bilbao, España.
imanol.telleria@ehu.eus

Recibido: agosto de 2023
Aceptado: octubre de 2023

Palabras clave: derecha alternativa; ideologías; postmodernismo; neoconservadurismo
Keywords: alt-right; ideologies; postmodernism; neoconservatism

Resumen: En esta investigación se sostiene que la derecha alternativa se trata de un nuevo movimiento político con una militancia sustancialmente diferente a las militancias que tradicionalmente han ocupado el espacio político de la derecha o derecha extrema. La caracterización de la derecha alternativa es confusa, pues la mayoría de sus estudiosos lo hacen bajo los parámetros estadounidenses. Así, este trabajo pretende aclarar algunas cuestiones sobre el espacio político del que nace la derecha alternativa, observar sus características y cerciorarse de que estas demandas se ven reflejadas en actores políticos de primer nivel y actualidad, para concluir que se trata de un espacio en construcción, pero diferenciado de otras corrientes ideológicas cercanas.

Abstract: This research argues that the alternative right is a new political movement with a membership that is substantially different from the militants that have traditionally occupied the political space of the right or extreme right. The characterization of the alternative right is confusing, since most of its scholars do it under the American parameters. Thus, this work aims to clarify some questions about the political space from which the alternative right is born, observe its characteristics and make sure that these demands are

reflected in top-level and current political actors, to conclude that it is a space under construction, but differentiated from other nearby ideological currents.

I. Introduction

With this manuscript we intend to capture both the operation and the guiding principles of the “alternative right”: the new phenomenon born in the United States and exported to part of Europe and even to Latin America (Reguera, 2017). The main hypothesis of this work is that the Alt-Right comes from the neoconservative space, but that it attracts part of the political space called the New Far Right. In addition, we maintain that it serves as a refuge for other ideologies, and that they hide behind it to fight the so-called culture wars (Marquez and Laje, 2016).

However, this phenomenon is fueled –militarily, but not intellectually– above all by a very young sector of digital natives, with no apparent relationship with the conservative world. What seems to be a uniting nucleus between them is the fight against political correctness and the SJW¹. Perhaps this ideological current still lacks great ideological principles (a worldview), since its structure is much more flexible and liquid (Bauman, 2000), which is why it responds better to a postmodern society. As we have mentioned, it constructs itself by observing its political and ideological rivals (Ansart, 1974), such as the new identities or post-ideologies (Letamendia, 2013) which have arisen in postmodernity (Maiz and Lois, 2020) (e.g. feminism, environmentalism or animalism).

¹ SJW: Social Justice Warriors. This term, coined by the alt-right, refers to people who are politically correct and champions of the morality of non-transgression.

The alt-right attributes these new identities or “ideologies” to the Frankfurt school, to critical theory and to various poststructuralist authors; “they embody the neo-Marxist ideology of political correctness” (Moldbug, 2021), and it accuses them of disparaging Western culture and of wanting to transform it artificially, calling this social engineering, i.e., “*the destruction of the values that built Western civilization. A great operation of anthropological and social engineering.*” (Foro Cultura21, 2021). In addition, it relates them to extreme left wing and Marxist movements, pointing out that after the impossibility of economic Marxism they have passed to a cultural plane, prioritizing the superstructure to end Western culture.

Moreover, the alt-right is fighting another front with the liberals, specifically with the ideological family of the liberal-progressives, who have a universalist, globalist outlook (Griffin, 2000). It accuses these liberals of appropriating the discourse –or at least internalizing it– of the new identitarianisms that seek to end Western culture and the logic of the nation-state, to dissolve it into a fully globalized world with market values (the religion of money²).

² The religion of money: a term used in the jargon of the alt-right that refers to the work of Walter Benjamin called “Capitalism as Religion”. Although the work is perhaps slightly distorted, the term refers to those people of a globalist liberal tendency who lack metaphysical values and whose only commandment is to earn money without moral limits. This term is often used in a derogatory way of great magnates or philanthropists belonging to the Davos or Bilderberg forums who seek to destroy the Nation-States and

Neo-Marxism –descendants of the Marxist Frankfurt school— is a variant of anti-capitalism, which penetrates through to the “most hung-up liberals” (El montonero, 2019). Compared with more liberal (French) positions, which pursue universalism and globalism, this new movement converges, opting for more differentialized positions.

In brief, the main research question is ‘What is the alt-right and what are its guiding principles?’ In this way, we want to show that the alt-right already has a unique, differentiated space.

To do so, we will carry out a mixed study. In the first place, this is an exploratory piece of research, since we start from the premise –consolidated by academics such as Raim (2017), Reguera (2017) and Brown (2019)— that the alt-right exists as a differentiated space. Subsequently, we will carry out a descriptive study to find out their demands and purposes by analyzing speeches, manifestos and the political positions of the actors who move in this space.

Furthermore, we pose a secondary research question on the origins and convergences of this new political movement. We will show that this political movement comes from the neoconservative political tradition, but that it also draws on other ideologies such as the New Far Right.

The purpose is to adjust to and label a new political phenomenon, because, although its use in the media and colloquial sphere is more widespread, in the academic sphere it has not yet been clearly defined, as different political movements have been mixed and combined under

dissolve the Judeo-Christian ethic by imposing a monetary ethic.

the same label, when in reality they are very different political expressions.

George Hawley is perhaps the greatest alt-right theorist. In his book *Making Sense of The Alt Right* (2017), he traces a pre-alt-right genealogy. In the book, he proposes that the alt-right comes from the American paleoconservative space, against the neoconservative establishment³. Hawley argues that the main source of the radicalization of Internet users comes from the alternative right and they have created an unstructured political movement but with a specific objective (2019). Thus, taking refuge in the immunity granted by the anonymity of the Internet, “young peo-

³ This seems contradictory to the intention of this manuscript. However, as the article claims, we will try to escape from the American characterizations, since the phenomenon can only be understandable in its place of origin when, in reality, it is a common phenomenon in Western democracies with massive access to the Internet. Thus, when Hawley (2017) refers to paleoconservatism, he refers to a specific American political movement led by Samuel Francis (2005) and Paul Gottfried (2014). It would be a political movement that is extremely critical of liberal democracy and hegemonic conservatism, since they assume that there is a moralization of democratic principles. The problem begins with the difficult characterization of the paleoconservative movement outside the US parameters and the treatment given to neoconservatism. And it is that, the liberal concept, having a progressive connotation or equivalence, the use of neoliberal terminology is confusing. For this reason, when the American academy characterizes neoconservatism, it would be understanding it as a political movement close to Reagan or even Bush, when the treatment of the European academy is usually the characterization of these as neoliberals. Therefore, our proposal is the understanding of neoconservatism under the parameters of Bell (1994) and Berguer (1986), as a radicalized conservatism of Christian democratism and with a fundamental antagonism to neoliberal principles.

ple began to share their experiences and anger with high doses of humor where machismo, racism and homophobia predominated” (Reguera, 2017), the young Internet users, trying to being provocative and countercultural, they situate them in fascist positions against their leftist adversaries (Nagle, 2017).

This argument is structured so that we firstly identify and explain the ideological origins and family prior to the alt-right (with its indirect and direct heritage). Second, we develop the guiding concepts of this new space; third, we exemplify, not in a systematic, but descriptive way, the presence of these guiding principles in leading political actors; and finally, we make some tentative conclusions that serve to look forward in this subject of study, in which there is so much to research and write.

2. The ideological family of the alt-right

Ideologies (del Águila, 2002) –in strict sense of the term– belong to the cultural stage of modernity, marked by a belief system that creates a worldview. However, for postmodern ideologies, the most appropriate term is political ideals, since they respond to a contextual problem. It is possible that the loss of this worldview is due to the new cultural context, to the absolute triumph of liberal democracy and to the “entryism⁴” of new ideologies, which have turned into political movements or political ideals. For this reason, we will often refer to the alt-right as a political

4 Entryism: a political strategy that consists of entering a system, party or regime to reformulate its principles from within the organization or system.

movement, ideological current or ideology in its broadest sense.

If we view ideologies continuously, where the different ideological currents do not have an end, but a transformation or adaptation, we may suspect that the alt-right comes from the family of neoconservatism and, in addition, feeds on other similar ideologies that have seen an internalization of demands in the alt-right that others were seeking. This does not mean that neoconservatism or the New Extreme Right have disappeared, but it does mean that they have converged into a more plural and much more popular space.

In first place, we have to explain that we understand conservatism to be a counter ideology, or even a practice that delves into other ideologies (Baqués, 2020), with perhaps conservative liberalism as the ideological trend that has most permeated conservatism. “They are against having a set of ideas to carry out in society... They are ideas of a position that is militantly anti-ideological, which has no action programme and entrusts everything to political experience.” (Rivero, 2020: 46).


However, although in this work we take the previous premise for granted, other authors, such as Saralegui, point in the opposite direction, noting that conservatism could be an ideology. Consequently, in the form of a thermometer, we will look at the differences between “Pragmatic Conservatism” and “Reactionary Conservatism”. Pragmatic Conservatism is much nearer to the ideological current of conservative liberalism, since it advocates reform and not revolution, to maintain certain principles that maintain social cohesion and its hierarchy.

However, Reactionary Conservatism aims to change the system that orders society

to a system that is more exactly suited to the current moment, since it operates in contemporary time. The various fascist ideologies and the New Far Right are closer to this concept. Donoso Cortés maintains that “it is no longer possible to return to the old order; a new one must be created, because the conditions of existence of the old regime have vanished” (Schmitt, 1923: 33), an assessment that Schmitt interprets in an effort to combine knowledge about the reaction. In other words, authors close to Reactionary Conservatism, “are conservative of soul, but they have not lost their sensitivity towards time, the mutable features of the

moment and the concrete. Therefore, they understand that each moment demands a different solution” (Saralegui, 2016: 92).

Both conservatism –pragmatic— and the reaction, although they have certain similarities, are substantially different, and even ideologically they come from different places. However, the framing of the alt-right within one of these two currents can be complicated, since it contains symptoms of both concepts. As we see in the diagram, we can say that the alt-right comes from the branch of conservative liberalism but is also nurtured by nationalist ideology.



Source: Image from own sources⁵.

5 Clarification on the image: both Liberalism and Socialism are moved by the capital-labor arguments, while nationalism operates with other rea-

soning. In addition, the diagram is not complete, but simply tries to reflect the social reality that we are describing in this work.

2.1. Indirect heritage

When we refer to an indirect heritage, we mean the ideological tradition⁶ of the alt-right. It is important to know this tradition, since it keeps within its principles certain ideas and premises of the branches from which it comes. In other words, we will unravel the underlying arguments of the ideological branches by which this new political space is nourished.

Within the indirect heritage, we will analyze the liberal-conservative branch, on the one hand, and the nationalist branch, on the other. However, before explaining and characterizing the main points of conservative liberalism as an ideological tradition, we must mention that there are great differences between the authors who shape it, and this is related to the *differential* nature of conservative liberalism.

The principles of the main classical authors, Edmund Burke and David Hume, have been taken and used to name and shape a political space, although they themselves never thought they were theorizing about an ideological tradition. For this reason, conservative liberalism can hardly be considered an ideology as such, since it is not based on teleological principles. In the words of Professor Rivero: “in the first place a paradox has to be pointed out. Conservative liberals are averse to theory, and they distrust ideologies as guides to action. Furthermore, they deplore ideological politics guided by values, ideas or lines of thought that come before action” (Rivero, 2020: 47). In oth-

6 Ideological tradition: a current of thought that brings together numerous ideologies, as it maintains certain axioms, premises and arguments which be adopted by the ideologies that appear within the same tradition.

er words, it constructs itself as a way of doing politics that is adapted to the social reality of the moment, un-ideologized or even counter-ideological, since it argues that the ideologization of technique—even social—is the decadence that will destroy social cohesion. Therefore, from this point of view, it is argued that “rationalist politics are the politics of the felt need, the felt need not qualified by a genuine, concrete knowledge of the permanent interests and direction of movement of a society, but interpreted by ‘reason’ and satisfied according to the technique of an ideology: they are the politics of the book.” (Oakeshott, 1991).

For this reason, we can say that conservative liberalism constructs itself as a counter ideology, due to its teleological lack; “the valuable non-existent ideal (utopia) is only a threat to the best we have” (Rivero, 2020: 48). Moreover, by giving more weight to context, it is more open to pragmatism than to dogmatism—of abstract ideas. In accordance with this, it also has a historicist character, since its principles are based on ancient and recent history to explain itself.

In addition, conservative liberalism has a peculiarity that does not usually exist in other ideological currents that tend towards social unification. Conservative liberalism refers to meritocracy, as it seeks to naturalize inequality by giving it an ethical component. In other words, it maintains that equality does not exist in a substantive way, since what is learned by individuals is different, as are their aptitudes; equality only hurts society, as it would break the social hierarchies necessary for society to be prosperous.

Regarding the nationalist branch, it is also necessary to point out that many authors

do not recognize nationalism as an ideology, since it does not operate in terms of capital-labor, i.e., “it is not about who governs but about who the governed are” (Caminal, 2020: 282). However, in this study we will treat it as an ideological branch, since we can see that it has developed different political and ideological movements within this ideological branch, and, in addition, it consists of a corpus extensive enough to organize a worldview and it has a teleological principle.

When we speak of nationalism as an ideology, we can divide it into two types. On the one hand, political or liberal nationalism, which sees the nation as a political subject because it consists of a State, and all its nationals are all citizens who are under the protection of this State, and who consist of “the subjective need to feel like a member of a national-state” (Caminal, 2020: 291). On the other hand, we have romantic nationalism, more linked to sentiment; “The people and the homeland are bearers of a guarantee, of earthly eternity (nature) and therefore, it is situated above the State” (Fichte, 1988). As we can see, this nationalism does not define the nation by the borders or limits of the State, but rather maintains that the nation is a linguistic, ethnic, religious and/or cultural political community, in other words; “the basis of building the political nation, the feeling of identity and the will to belong to a nation, which would arise from historical and cultural roots that are transmitted from generation to generation.” (Caminal, 2020: 287). This is an academic division, and in practice, this division is much more porous. Despite this, we consider the branch of romantic nationalism as that most closely linked to this study.

This nationalism is based on a concept of *arcadia*⁷, and is fed by the sharing of the same ethos of a political culture. In that sense, it is closely related to conservatism and the importance given to the natural institution as a way of internalizing customs, tradition, language and culture. However, in this case it does have a more teleological character, aiming to reach the last stage of arcadia. Obviously, nationalism flees from the typical rationalism of the classical ideologies of modernity to replace it with a rather romantic concept.

2.2. The direct heritage of the alt-right

However, when we refer to direct heritage, we aim to analyze the ideological currents that directly affect the alt-right, without going into all of its components and internal arguments, but rather analyzing the similarities and differences that can be clearly identified with the alt-right.

The first of them, neoconservatism, is a highly academic, hardly militant ideology or movement, more reflected in the academic and cultural elites than in society. This movement comes from conservative liberalism which, as the 20th century progressed, subdivided into neoconservatives, Christian Democrats and neoliberals. Neoconservatism began in the 80s as the branch of conservative liberalism most

⁷ Arcadia: This term refers to an ancient region of Greece, and describes a wonderful, utopian place. Within nationalist rhetoric, it is used to describe a final stage. The first stage is a harmonious, epic stage of the nation, the second stage is a stage of decadence due to the loss of power or identity and the last stage in which it is built with nationalism is the return to that first harmonious stage.

inclined towards conservatism, in which pragmatic liberalism is admitted, but at the same time criticizes its social impact. In other words, “neoconservatism revitalizes a discourse favorable to the market economy ... but, on the other hand, develops a critique ... of the moral and cultural drifts of capitalism” (Baqués, 2020: 420). Neoconservatism, despite belonging to the same political tradition as neoliberalism, criticizes its lack of morality and the hyper-individualism that it generates, a criticism that, as we will see, the alt-right will carry on.

Neoconservatism naturalizes inequality, i.e., it admits that inequality is beneficial for society and for the individual, since individuals are different and have different capacities, and this will provide a social hierarchy. Therefore, the State should not correct these inequalities because they subtract personality from individuals themselves, “mediocritizing them”. Furthermore, authors such as Peter Sloterdijk speak of “the danger of too much state intervention, turning into an exorbitant Welfare State that does not allow individuals to grow by themselves and making people fully dependent on the State” (Sloterdijk, 2003). As if that were not enough, if the State controls the lives of individuals, they depend on it and the bureaucracy grows larger, making it clumsier and limiting civil liberty. One example of this is the Tea Party, specifically the originalist sector⁸, which advocates minimal state intervention. Both neoliberalism and neoconserv-

⁸ Originalism: this refers to the original interpretation of the United States constitution. However, outside the legal panorama, it is used to refer to a more conservative sector of the Tea Party, which advocates a very limited State, since there is fear and skepticism that it can influence the lives of citizens too much.

atism seek minimal state intervention, but for different reasons.

However, neoconservatism (as interpreted this time by Berguer and Bell) also criticizes capitalism, since it maintains that “there is a cultural imbalance that segments society and dislocates it” (Bell, 1994), creating a cold world in which there are only individuals, and the collective and the social spheres are lost. It is really a criticism of neoliberalism, since it maintains that, because of it, capitalism has lost its transcendental ethics, which will cause a return to nihilism, seen this time as postmodernism. In the neo-conservative diagnosis, we see the fulfillment of that old prophecy by Weber about the moral support of capitalism when he warned “the case has been emptied of spirit, who knows if definitely” (Weber, 2012, 224).

The second direct heritage of the alt-right is the new extreme right. This is a political movement that began after the Second World War, and it is the convergence between nostalgic supporters of National Socialism, the extreme right and historically traditionalist sectors. “There are taxonomic problems in qualifying this political space... although there are several typological attempts that unite many of these parties on the radical right, in opposition to and in reaction to movements from the 1970s” (Simón, 2020: 501).v

There is a change in trend in their previously racist positions. The new extreme right rejects racial issues to put cultural issues on the political table. For this reason, racism is replaced by “xenophobia” or cultural racism, i.e. “abandoning racist classic scientism, but still protecting ethnocentrism” (Torrens, 2020: 590). This is how they argue that “the immigrant’s

culture and customs are incompatible with national traditions and constitute an imminent threat to the identity and survival of the country itself” (Simón, 2020: 521). Their main criticism is of the ethnopluralism, later reformulated by the alt-right as multiculturalism, which has been happening in most Western countries, criticizing their tepid reaction to the immigrant population that does not fully adopt the memes and customs of the host country. In addition, there is a certain Islamophobia, as they consider that it is incompatible with Western culture.

Within this ideological family, there has always been a workerist component that has advocated a social restructuring that would benefit the productive classes of the nation more –embracing a concept of the people against the elites. The new extreme right organizes national producers in the same way to leave them in a better position vis-à-vis external producers –a result of globalization–, and for this reason they tend to use populist methods, articulating the people against the elites (not against business owners) of a liberal state. The New Far Right is governed by palingenesis, in which, applied to this context, “it advocates organic harmony between employers and workers, in which each person has their own role, according to their situation in the hierarchical structure.” (Simón. 2020:531). It holds the belief that the State, as it is controlled by the nation, should have the ability to direct the lives of its nationals.

Coherently, the New Far Right stands for the exclusiveness typical of romantic nationalism. In other words, it supports unique ethnocentrism⁹ in the nation, as a single possible ethos.

9 Ethnocentrism: Attitude of the group, race or society that presupposes its superiority over oth-

Another guiding principle shared by the majority of the New Far Right is their religious ethics, as we can see in the Dutch political party Centre’86: “Self-enrichment, criminal materialism, devaluation of our basic values, secularization...abortion and euthanasia practices, pornography, destruction of marriage... these are the results of the excesses of contemporary society” (Centre Party ’86, 1986).

Finally, we include paleolibertarianism, libertarian movements and minarchism, in a third group of direct influence on the alt-right. When we talk about these movements, we do not mean classic libertarians, like Mises or Hayek, who could be seen as part of current neoliberalism. Rather, this is a trend of libertarian ideas that has moved towards a substantive meritocratic, anti-liberal progressive discourse. They could even be framed within dissident liberalism, since they maintain that their first subject is the individual and not any group to which they belong. Moreover, when looking at group membership, they relativize this fact through transversality, assuming that we belong equally to numerous groups but that the individual prevails over them.

These are different currents within anarcho-capitalism and postmodern libertarianism that have been attracted by paleolibertarianism and some of its principles, unlike Beltway libertarianism¹⁰, since some argue that “libertarians (beltway) hate western culture, this culture that is worth preserving and defending, since

ers and makes its own culture the only criterion to interpret and value culture.

10 Beltway Libertarianism: this is an ideological current within institutionalized libertarianism in the United States which is considered by hard libertarianism or paleolibertarianism as left-wing.

Judeo-Christian values are the standards that we know and we have built society and the market” (Rockwell, 2008). Thus, these ideological currents maintain their capitalist and anti-statist principles, but they assume that there are certain institutions (such as the family and the company) that benefit the political community socially, and therefore they do not reject them.

This current is also directly opposed to the policies of the New Deal, since they maintain that state intervention is amoral and that it is also impractical, since what is public is only a political misappropriation of what is private. They even affirm that: “Libertarianism –minarchism, paleolibertarianism— is the enemy of classical liberalism, since we libertarians are against the central bank and inefficient services such as health or public education” (Murray Rothbard, 1973).

The philosophical premises that paleolibertarianism follows are the right to life, private property and freedom, viewing these three rights in a negative way (Berlin, 1988). Thus, a minarchist¹¹ ideological current is built in terms of ideological corpus and the State, because the more that is written and the more it is delimited, the more freedom is reduced.

This movement has appropriated the slogan “Don’t Tread On Me” and the Gadsden flag¹² as the motto and shield

11 Minarchism: a political doctrine that aspires to reduce the state to its minimum possible practical expression, and therefore where freedom –the free market— is as broad as possible.

12 Gadsden Flag: This is a flag originating in the American War of Independence. On the flag you can see a rattlesnake in defensive stance for an imminent attack. The historical meaning of the flag is the defensive position of the rattlesnake

of minarchist and paleolibertarian ideas, highlighting the motto of non-aggression, interpreting it that the State attacks citizens when it intervenes in society, because tax collection is interpreted as theft and embezzlement.

3. The guiding concepts of the alt-right

In this section we aim to answer the main research question, to show through the demands and the articulation of the alt-right discourse that it exists as a real and differentiated political space (and under construction). We have already warned that the current academic state of the alt-right can be somewhat confusing, as there is still little literature on this subject (Raim, 2017). On some occasions, this political phenomenon is treated as within the New Far Right or as a renewal and “militantization” of the neoconservative movement. However, in this study we propose that it has a new politically differentiated space of its own.

Before beginning the characterization of the alt-right which has emerged in the United States, we must make a small mention of the two currents present within it. On the one hand, there is the *ALT-Right* (whose faction name is the same as the name of the political movement) and on the other hand, the *ALT-Light* (the soft or moderate alternative). The former comes from a space more akin to the New Far Right and is widely supported

- since the rattlesnake does not attack without being threatened - symbolically incarnating the United States in times of its independence.

by rednecks¹³, and the latter, closer to the neoconservative movement, is mostly supported by more urban classes. The second faction has almost total control of the movement, reducing the more radical faction to internal discussions and power spaces that are highly controlled by the more moderate. We can see that the alt-right is not a homogeneous bloc and builds itself by outlining its opponents rather than by articulating itself.

For this reason, there is a problem when it comes to classifying the alt-right in terms of their roadmap, since they move between the conservatism of the neoconservatives and the *reaction* (*reactionary thinking*) of the New Far Right.

We can divide the discursive articulation of the alt-right into three parts; the concepts that they inherit directly from other ideologies, the concepts that they acquire by themselves or that they reformulate by qualifying some aspects, and those that they acquire from their context.

In the concepts that they inherit from other ideologies, we will explain the heritage that the alt-right has acquired from the currents analyzed above. The first characteristic that it inherits from the conservative tradition is *differentialism*. This means that it does not believe in epistemological or moral universalism, but that its principles and postulates are closer to relativism. We could say that there are differences between political communities, holding that societies do not follow an evolutionary pattern, but rather a development based

on a series of values that articulate society; “*conservatism directs its criticisms towards both determining collectivism and radical individualism.*” (Nisbet, 1995). To illustrate this idea, we could exemplify it with some Middle Eastern countries whose political regime is substantially different from liberal democracy. According to the logic of the alt-right, even if these countries were to modernize, without the influence of Western countries they would never become liberal democracies, since liberal democracy is an institution derived from Christian and Western culture. This relativism arising from differentialism also affects its concept of time; this ideology was built on the principle of historicity, i.e., it was created to respond to a specific context and its articulation will cease to be valid when that changes.

Another characteristic of the alt-right is the naturalization of inequality. This is an idea that it also acquires from the conservative tradition and that Axel Kaiser, considered one of the fathers of the non-Anglo-Saxon alt-right (with great influence in the Anglo-Saxon world too), covers in his work “The tyranny of equality: Why egalitarianism is immoral and undermines the progress of our society” (Kaiser, 2017). This author suggests giving a different meaning to the word equality, seeing equality as equal rights. In other words, as the classical liberal-conservatives maintain, inequality itself is characteristic of the human being –and therefore is equality– and trying to collectivize subjects through a false equality –that substantive equality– only reduces the freedom of the individual, making them more dependent. As Dawkins says, “we are survival machines, robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes” (1976). Thanks to this natural equality, society will

13 Redneck: a term used in the United States to refer to the stereotype of a white man who live in the center of the country and does not have much economic or cultural capital. It is used pejoratively to refer to those people who think conservatively or even ultra-conservatively.

be able to organise itself into hierarchies according to the skills and efforts of citizens.

The alt-right, in addition, starts from a premise close to minarchism that the public is perhaps not entirely inefficient, but that professional politicians corrupt the public. A reinterpretation of the paleolibertarian positions regarding the efficiency of the State is made, arguing that the public suffers because of the administrative leadership of politicians, since they are inexperienced in management. Donald Trump's star proposal was a change from public management to a more business-based model, reminding everyone that he was the one to do it, since he was not a politician and came from the business world (Brown, 2019). In addition, there is a majority within the alt-right that advocates tax cuts and reduction of the State, since they think that it is too extensive and favors unproductive people in the form of subsidies, linking it with the neoconservative ideology that the State overprotects social sectors too much and causes them to become parasites of the system.

It is also important to mention conspiracism within the alt-right. This argues that the cultural, economic and political elites of the state are controlled by the philanthropists of "the religion of money", in other words, by great magnates belonging to the Davos and Bilderberg forums, whose objective is to destroy or destabilize nations to end cultures and globalize the world under a single culture and a single state: money.

Finally, we must mention that the alt-right subscribes to the policy of "Law and Order" that the New Far Right has historically embraced. Although perhaps it has been losing the directionist nuance of

the State over society that the New Far Right had, to only aim for a firm State – rather than strong, since they propose the reduction of it— that guarantees social order, against possible "revolutions of the extreme left", of post-Marxism, of self-styled anti-fascist movements and of *postmodern identity movements*¹⁴. The alt-right calls the riots caused by these groups street terrorism, and considers that they are encouraged by the elites to destabilize the West and bring about a cultural revolution.

Next, we will explain the general characteristics that the alt-right reformulates based on the concepts of ideological predecessors and on new concepts that it has acquired by itself, since its political rivals have also changed and have had to reformulate and learn new concepts (Ariño, 1997).

The first concept that it has acquired by itself is the cultural anorexia of the right, an essential concept characterizing the alt-right. Kaiser (2009) highlights how the right wing has gradually lost its social and cultural discourse, subordinating itself merely to a role of administrator. In this way, a *re-leftization* of the political scene has progressively taken place, since the right does not even try to fight a cultural battle, worrying about short-termism. In other words, the alt-right –hence its name— has arisen as a response to the traditional right which, according to them, has left a political space orphaned, since it has been emptied of social and ideological content. Closely linked to the concept

14 Postmodern identity movements: a term used by the alt-right for concrete movements within cultural Marxism to refer to movements such as feminism (gender ideology), environmentalism, animalism and homosexuality.

of cultural anorexia of the traditional right, the concept of “culture wars” was born. This term refers to the ideological battle that must be waged against the post-Marxist left and globalist liberalism. The alt-right aspires to be the majority in society, and it is not limited only to pointing out unfair and immoral aspects, but it wants to set itself up as a real option in opposition to liberal leftism. Therefore, the first step of the culture wars is to win within its own political spectrum, *re-ideologizing* the right in the values of the alt-right, in order to compete on equal terms against its political adversaries.

However, the alt-right constructs itself by looking at its political adversary. Thus, it rejects concepts from other ideologies that do not completely match the ideological tradition and internal logic that it has. In fact, Kaiser (2020) proposes the term *neo-inquisition* to refer to policies in his opinion of the censorious nature of the postmodern left. He maintains that we currently live in a politically correct society, where cultural elites proselytize towards the oppressed postmodern identities of the Western order. That is why it is categorized between good –embodied by those identities— and evil –anyone who does not subscribe to them, without exception— and where evil is persecuted by the militants (Social Justice Warriors) and by institutions and corporations. The term *neo-inquisition* has already transcended this author and it is common to hear alt-right activists refer to it to talk about quota policies and other issues related to *social engineering*¹⁵.

15 *Social engineering*: a term used by the alt-right to refer to those policies that actively affect society, modifying it and alienating it from its own being with the intention in the future of changing the State. In other words, it is about en-

Another concept extended by the alt-right is the concept of cultural Marxism. Laje and Márquez (2016) argue that neo-Marxism or cultural Marxism have been articulated by authors who follow critical theory and poststructuralism through Marxist revisionism, since they have given more importance to the superstructure than to the infrastructure, thus abandoning more materialistic positions. Through new identitarianisms, such as gender ideology, environmentalism, and indigenism they have articulated a reductionist discourse to oppressors and oppressed using Marxist arguments. In this concept, the aim is to break with western culture or what these identitarianisms call the “hetero-capitalist tradition”, and they seek to dominate first (the authors maintain that they have already achieved it) the superstructure, such as public opinion, academia and different cultural elites, to later dominate the infrastructure (they are in the process) by attracting globalist liberals to their positions.

One clear example of what the alt-right perceives as cultural Marxism is what they call *gender ideology*. The alt-right maintains that there is a hegemonic feminism that has replaced traditional feminism, which advocates the suppression of the patriarchy and the consequences it has on both men and women, and even in some cases the abolition of gender. The alt-right sees this as neo-Marxism, since feminism self-perceives women as oppressed by the patriarchal system –like the worker before under capitalism— and that she must free herself from oppression through the overthrow of the patriarchy. In addition, there is another group opposed

couraging social change since society is not yet ready for a change in the system.

to the oppressed which is the oppressor, embodied by the male (white, according to the feminist current that is studied as a reference), since he has internalized the postulates of the patriarchy. Therefore, gender ideology seeks to break with the patriarchy –capitalism— and destroy genders because they are a product of it –meaning the working classes and the bourgeoisie.

As we have mentioned, the alt-right has inherited the ethnocentrism of the New Far Right, although it transforms and reformulates it, articulating itself as anti-multiculturalism. It argues that economic elites who want to break up nations promote immigration to create a single political community, a single open society. The alt-right suggests that immigrants from other cultures should adopt the ethos of the political community where they arrive, because if they preserve the political culture from which they come, they will end up being socially excluded and will attract further immigrants with whom they share an ethos, causing the appearance of ghettos and social rupture between different minorities which are opposed to the hegemonic majority political culture, and in this way, they argue that “degenerate oligarchies turn entire nations into multicultural dungheaps” (Abascal, 2020).

For this reason, islamophobia (Kallis, 2018) is a characteristic that cannot be understood without anti-multiculturalism. For, in addition to the rejection of multiculturalism, the alt-right understands that Islamic societies are built on fundamentalist, expansionist pillars, thus making their culture incompatible with Western culture; the *clash of civilizations* as a new paradigm of interpretation of international order was proposed by Huntington (2005)

in the 90s. In other words, the Islamic ethos is a hard one and impossible to adapt to Western political culture because its philosophical principles are opposed to Christianity. Furthermore, the alt-right suspects that political Islamism seeks to expand westward through mass immigration and the non-adaptation of its emigrants (Akkerman, 2018).

However, in the alt-right there is also a feeling of victimhood. They see themselves as people of the majority ethos who, suddenly, are treated as oppressors in a system in which they have never benefited. A large number of people who make up this political movement do not have a conservative tradition –although now they want to ideologize the right— but rather have been orphans of a traditional left that has abandoned its workerist positions in order to protect minorities. Despite the fact that they see themselves as constant victims, their method is not victimization (at least the method of the mainstream that is closest to neoconservatism, ALT-Light) but irony, as we will explain later. In addition, the alt-right has a feeling of western decadence –inherited from the New Far Right— since in their eyes the West is disintegrating because of the elites that allow the perversion of the ethos by promoting multiculturalism and identity ideologies that only wish to set society against itself.

Although the alt-right is articulated in a very horizontal way and there is no prominent ideologue, instead forming a space that constructs itself and is in constant construction as we will see in the fourth section, it suffers from a contradiction in terms of leadership because, closer in heritage to the New Far Right, it is still

searching for a caudillo or katechon¹⁶. As a result, the alt-right mythologizes current politicians who profess much of their proposals, idealizing them or even granting them superhuman powers. They even, ironically, invent leaders by worshipping non-existent and imaginary figures – quasi-mythological– endowing them with extraordinary psychic and physical abilities. One example of this was the extravagant style and clothing of the protesters in the assault on the US Capitol in January 2021. As we will see later, this worship is a metaphor, i.e., the activists of the alt-right do not believe in the existence of these figures, but rather they are parodying the commander by endowing him with positive aptitudes so that he embodies a symbol. Another significant example in this regard is *Pepe the Frog*, king of *Kenkistan*, and the simulation of Nazi symbology.

Finally, we will explain how the alt-right adapts to the current context. It started at the beginning of the last decade, very prematurely and with little theoretical preparation. It is important to know the cultural context in which it exists and moves comfortably, using this same context to its advantage.

In this cultural change (Maiz and Lois, 2020), material interest (Inglehart, 1990) has ceased to have the weight that it could have among citizens, relegating it below other interests more linked to self-realization. The social class system (Wright, 1997) as understood in modernity (especially socialism) has also entered into

16 Katechon: a word used first by the apostle Saint Paul and later by Saint Augustine to refer to a subject that slows the advance of the antichrist. Later it was used by Carl Schmitt to refer to a visible head or leader who orders and directs the political movement.

crisis. Likewise, another key feature of postmodernity is the critique of modern rationalism and disproportionate scientism that the alt-right draws on. The alt-right, like other postmodern ideologies, responds rather to open and constantly evolving ideological spaces. It moves beneficially into postmodernity, but it is at odds with postmodernism. Jordan B. Peterson (2018) is one of the most widely recognized authors of the alt-right, and in his work, which he calls self-help, he provides advice on vital dilemmas related to ethics, psychology and religion. Certain metaphysical premises of the alt-right are revealed within these vital dilemmas, such as the idea that suffering is constituted in the structure of the being, the complicated acceptance of the terrible responsibility of life and the idea that the individual should go beyond victimization and redirect their life away from the immediate gratification of natural, wicked desires.

Closely related to this, and opposed to postmodern identity ideologies, is the alt-right. Peterson argues that the articulation of society around identity will only build different ethos and end the majority, unified political community. In addition, he maintains that the articulation of identity in discourse is Marxist and therefore perverse, since an individual by the fact of his characteristics is already classified and determined by his identity, leaving being –ego– as something secondary. Therefore, if all people are determined by their identity, there is no room for free will and freedom. The alt-right also points to the arbitrariness with which these postmodern identities are constructed. In other words, the alt-right affirms that these identity groups are created for victimization (Peterson, 2018), since we all belong to different groups and maintain numer-

ous identities without having to ideologize them.

Finally, we have to point out that the alt-right assumes democratic principles; not liberal democratic ones however, but illiberal democratic ones (Zakaria, 1997). This is not a rejection of individual freedom or values conceived in liberalism—since they do not reject classical liberalism, and they are even supported by libertarian sectors— but rather a rejection of hegemonic liberalism and the identitarians and minorities related to these. As Held (1997) foretold, “the political idea of democracy is the most powerful in the world... All actors struggle to adapt the concept to their vision of democracy, but the basic or rather the classical assumptions of democratic practice are being undermined”.

4. Empirical verification of the alt-right as a differentiated space

In this section, we will demonstrate that the alt-right is not only a small group of neo-activists or a forum where a social sector is expressed, but that it can have repercussions for top-level political actors such as Donald Trump (USA), Mateo Salvini (Italy), Bolsonaro (Brazil) or Santiago Abascal (Spain), among others. In other words, the demands, proposals and arguments proposed by groups of activists such as YouTubers, influencers and authors of the alt-right have had the capacity and repercussion for top-level political actors to endorse these measures.

Today, it is difficult to label different political actors in the category of traditional—and not so traditional— ideologies, but

rather, political actors offer policies made up of numerous ideologies. That is to say, these movements see themselves as interest groups in which they exert pressure on the political actor to carry out a series of specific policies, use the same language that they propose or even have some kind of symbolic regard for them (Del Campo, 2007).

We will verify the existence of the alt-right via a discursive comparison of the different political actors considered within or close to this political space. We must remember that, as Reguera (2017) says, the subject that supports the alt-right— mostly— is substantially different from the subjects that can end up supporting the New Extreme Right. The alt-right has followers in all types of social strata, but if we go to the hard core, we find a very young group of urban internet users, without any relation—necessarily— to the conservative tradition, although they may have assumed its arguments afterwards.

Looking at the background, we intend to study the speeches of the political actors who refer to the alt-right in issues within certain contexts, i.e., we will examine whether the proposed political actors speak about the same issues as the alt-right and if these political figures acquire the same language.

The political party Vox in Spain, as reported in the newspaper “El Plural”, has made numerous mentions of a term used by the alt-right: multiculturalism. This party has referred to poor neighborhoods or those with fewer resources as multicultural dungheaps. As we have explained, the alt-right maintains that multiculturalism is harmful to society, since it causes the ghettoization of some neighborhoods, making coexistence unsustainable. The

exact words of Rocio de Meer, Vox MP for Almería in reply to a PSOE MP were: “Multicultural dungheaps. Places where you, the privileged, want to condemn the poorest Spaniards to a bad life. Working-class neighborhoods turned into a hell that the wealthy do not set foot in, but that the most humble workers suffer daily” (Rocio de Meer, 2020). Other MPs from different countries such as Agrupación Nacional (France), La Lega (Italy) or the American Republican Party among others have made similar statements regarding this issue.

Related to the above, Matteo Salvini, president of the Italian Lega party, has criticized the words of Pope Francis for giving his approval to opening the borders to Muslim immigrants, since Salvini, like members of the alt-right, maintains that Islamic culture is incompatible with Western culture. Therefore, Salvini replied, “Respect for women is incompatible with a certain type of Islam” (Matteo Salvini, 2020). As we have already mentioned, the alt-right believes that Islamic culture is a harsh culture, incompatible with Western culture since it does not believe in Western freedom and even has an expansionist attitude. Many political parties, especially in Europe, hold ideas similar to those of the Italian leader, and make very similar statements.

The right-wing concepts of culture wars and cultural anorexia, as we have already mentioned, are important concepts for the alt-right. As reported by the newspaper “El Confidencial”, Abascal –through the platform Disenso, the think tank of the political party Vox– affirms that “Facing up to the left in the culture wars works and translates into votes” (Abascal, 2020). Other leaders of parties with similar ideological

positions take this position also, and even remember that the very existence of their party can be explained by the lack of social commitment of other parties from the traditional right which previously occupied their current political space.

The concepts of neo-inquisition and cultural Marxism are also cornerstones in the articulation of the alt-right. Although the terms may vary, the essence is the same: an intolerance of the left when imposing its thinking and the creation of postmodern identities for social polarization. Thus, Donald Trump, according to PanamPost, has reduced the funds of various different public administration agencies such as the Treasury department, as the US president argued that these agencies created divisive, anti-American propaganda. He even went so far as to prohibit certain activities as being close to critical race theory, a branch within critical theory and the Frankfurt school. Looking at what Trump has proposed, Abascal maintains that “Trump’s questioning of identity, opinion-prescribing and political correctness policies has not only not reduced his votes, but has not been an impediment to adding more support from the so-called minorities –referring to Hispanics and Afro-Americans– from people who are collectivized because of their sexual orientation or from women, the objects of victimization and collectivization by radical feminism and gender ideology” (Abascal, 2020). This line of argument is subscribed to by parties in Europe and a large sector of the American Republican Party, aligning itself with the opinion of the alt-right. We can see the clear dispute between identity and ideology, since the alt-right maintains that minorities are being used to propagandize the left and that instead of empowering them they victimize and

make them dependent. This is because “the victim is the hero of our time. Being a victim grants prestige, demands listening, promises and fosters recognition, activates a powerful generator of identity, of law, of self-esteem. It immunizes against any criticism and guarantees innocence beyond any reasonable doubt” (Giglioli, 2014).

In the second part of this section, we will study the form that the discourse of the alt-right takes in itself and how it is reflected in political actors, what their most common propaganda methods are and their semantic resources to attract their potential electorate.

Focusing on political activism, perhaps one of the most representative and widely known figures is Steve Bannon. Although he has not written any academic work, he is the figure who has had the most impact when it comes to political communication and propaganda –although not strictly ideologically, as is commonly thought. He is a political strategist who, like the other authors, is convinced that the right wing around the world must fight the culture wars that it has not done in recent decades. For this reason, when communicating, he adopts a strategy typical of the New Far Right, neopopulism (Stanley, 2008), adapting it to neoconservatism and creating a new political space. In other words, Berguer’s positions are adapted to a post-material and digitized world in which they are mixed with differentialism –in opposition to the universalist left– embodied in nationalism. “One virtue of national-popular projects is that they assume the cultural and ideological composition of the societies in which they are deployed” (Errejón, 2017). In this way, a new position is adopted that mixes a critique of globalism,

a defense of capitalism (not French liberalism, since it corrupts) and meritocracy, a defense of conservatism (as seen by Burke, without the need for religiosity), a feeling of Western decadence, Islamophobia, workerism and a criticism of multiculturalism and cultural Marxism.

Among Bannon’s greatest achievements is the great cyber-activism that he has achieved, and the social support that he has gained in very young sectors of society, where politically incorrect opinions take refuge through the anonymity of the internet that channeled in movements like *Pepe the Frog*.

Pepe the Frog is a widely extended meme in the alt-right, even camouflaged in what they see as the mainstream internet¹⁷. It is an anthropomorphic frog with a humanoid body that represents doubt, non-action and condescension. This figure was created for an American comedian, but it became popular in forums such as 4chan (and in other forums, such as the Spanish *forocoches*) in 2008. This is how the alt-right is started –socially– in this type of forum and keeps its figure alive, subsequently incorporating new features.

It is used as a symbol, and is even treated as a deity and as a leader. Superhuman characteristics have been attributed to it with the intention of creating a figure that embodies a katechon, affirming that it is the king of Kenkistan –using metaphor. The alt-right has used this symbolism to support and idealize political actors who are willing to use the language of the alt-right and try to meet their demands; even Donald Trump himself posted his portrait

¹⁷ Mainstream: this term means conventional, but it should be noted that the alt-right gives it a pejorative meaning, since it deals with the other or non-ideologized.

of Pepe the Frog on his Twitter feed, in complicity with the alt-right. Pepe the Frog embodies any person who professes the values of the alt-right, i.e., all those who profess –in the act– the alt-right are caricatured as Pepe the Frog.

Reguera (2017) maintains that the alt-right comes from a historically non-conservative, very young sector, but that due to various different factors it has embraced anti-minority and anti-feminist theses. These ideas began expanding thanks to the anonymity of the internet and participation in forums –and later in video games– where they showed their concerns through black humor. This is how a new “ideology” was created from apoliticism and black humor through memes, fighting what cannot be said on the street, what is politically incorrect. It is a very horizontal movement, and impunity in the face of social disapproval is what causes its radicalization. The political method of propaganda is to blur how far the joke goes and where the propaganda begins, and even to create its own jargon (including LibsTards¹⁸ and masculinism).

As Reguera comments, one method of political propaganda can be found at the difficult dividing line where humor ends and propaganda begins. In these forums, and then in social networks –with anonymous avatars– and video games, it has fed on (sometimes-extreme) black humor, without any kind of limit. Internet users satirize any aspect of life, including contempt and humiliation towards minorities, which has caused a spiral that little by little has consolidated around this new

18 LibTards: a term used by the alt-right to refer to globalist liberals, who want a better and more equal world, as naive puppets of millionaire philanthropists and the religion of money.

ideology. Currently, irony and black humor continue to be the main method of attracting young people, as the alt-right maintain that they feel socially reproached for saying what they really think, and even for recounting social facts without *purple-tinted glasses*¹⁹.

Although there are formal authors from which this ideology feeds, informal authors such as YouTubers²⁰ are the ones that have the most repercussion among their militants. Milo Yiannopoulos, a famous militant alt-right YouTuber, maintains that this is a movement similar to May 68 in relation to the questioning of the moralization of the left, rebelling against the conventional thinking of the moment. In other words, he argues that the left has moralized society in its ideology, so any thought outside of this mold is socially rejected. For this reason, he maintains that the movement of the alt-right is equivalent to May 68, and that it will end up by demoralizing society, to then re-ideologize it. These YouTubers –young activists– and other content creators, are the ones who export these ideas to thousands of consumers, penetrating deep into the social stratum (Cocker and Cronin, 2017; Tolson, 2010).

19 Purple-tinted glasses: This term refers to and satirizes the so-called gender perspective by feminism. The alt-right maintains that maintaining this view –the same is true of other postmodern identitarianisms– only skews reality in favor of cultural Marxism.

20 YouTuber: a term referring to the content creators who upload videos to the YouTube platform.

5. Conclusion

Before making a final conclusion to this study, we must ask ourselves whether we have been able to answer the research questions satisfactorily.

The first research question we tried to answer was ‘Where does the alt-right come from?’ Trying to find an ideological heritage for the alt-right –under the assumption of linear ideologies– we have found that it comes from a neoconservative space with a conservative ideological tradition, at least in terms of issues and problems addressed. However, other ideological currents such as the New Far Right have made more than notable contributions, not only providing propaganda methods, but have even contributed different concepts that the alt-right has reestablished and modified. In addition to this, other ideological currents such as paleolibertarianism or minarchist movements have provided contextual and conceptual influences, giving a new perspective on the vision of the State.

The secondary research question is seen as a confirmation of the main research question, which is the conceptualization and characterization of the alt-right. In other words, it was about finding the manifestations in active politics –in political actors– of the alt-right. We have studied this by looking at the background, with the internalization of the demands of the alt-right in different political actors and through the form they use, with the examples of how they have been manifested by political actors (speeches, propaganda) and how it has affected alt-right militancy.

With the help of these questions, we have answered the main research question:

what the alt-right is, what its guiding principles are and whether, based on them, we could consider it a unique and differentiated space. We have distinguished between the ideological characteristics that it has acquired directly from the aforementioned ideologies, its own characteristics and its own concepts that it has acquired as new problems and new adversaries have emerged, and the characteristics that it has acquired, due to the cultural, economic and social context in which the alt-right moves. After this analysis, we can affirm that the alt-right is a unique, differentiated political space, since the cultural context is another context in which other ideologies close to the alt-right are formed. Moreover, it has acquired new concepts, recasting them or even inventing them to respond to new problems.

Finally, as we have said during the text, we are aware that studies into this political space have only just begun, and from now on, different views and contributions will enrich an interesting and necessary debate about the questions raised here.

6. Bibliography

Academic and informative bibliography

Ahedo, I. & Telleria, I. (2020). “Neoliberalismo”. In Antón, J. & Torrens, X. (Ed.) *Ideologías y movimientos políticos contemporáneos*. Madrid: Tecnos.

Akkerman, T. (2018). Partidos de extrema derecha y políticas de inmigración en la UE, Anuario CIDOB de la Inmigración 2018, pg. 48-62 DOI: doi.org/10.24241/AnuarioCIDOBInmi.2018.48

- Ansart, P. (1974). *Les idéologies politiques*. París: PUF
- Amin, S. (1998). *El capitalismo en la era de la globalización*. Barcelona: Paidós.
- Arias, M. (2020). *Nostalgia del Soberano*. Madrid: Catarata.
- Ariño, A. (1997). "Ideologías, discursos y dominación", *REIS*, Vol 1, Nu 79, pp. 297-220.
- Baqués, J. (2009). "El otro rostro de Jano: la dimensión conservadora de Hayek", *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, Vol 1, Nu 20, pp. 147-173.
- Baqués, J. (2020). "Neoconservadurismo". In Antón, J. & Torrens, X. (Ed.) *Ideologías y movimientos políticos contemporáneos*. Madrid: Tecnos.
- Bauman, Z. (2000). *Liquid Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity press.
- Bell, D. (1974). "The Public Household-on fiscal sociology and the liberal society". *Public Interest*, Vol 1, Nu 37, pp. 29-68.
- Bell, D. (1994). *Las contradicciones culturales del capitalismo*. Madrid: Alianza.
- Berger, P. L. (1986). *La revolución Capitalista: cincuenta proposiciones sobre la prosperidad, la igualdad y la libertad*. Madrid: Península.
- Berlin, I. (1988). Cuatro ensayos sobre la libertad. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
- Bernabe, D. (2018). *La trampa de la diversidad. Cómo el liberalismo fragmentó la identidad de la clase trabajadora*. Madrid: Akal.
- Bové, J. (2002). "A farmers International", *New Left Review*, Vol 1, Nu 12, pp. 89-101.
- Brown, W. (2019). *In the Ruins of Neoliberalism. The Rise of Antidemocratic Politics in the West*. Nueva York: Columbia University Press.
- Buruma, I. and Margalit, A. (2005). *Ocidentalismo*. Barcelona: Península.
- Caminal, M. (2020). "Nacionalismo". In Antón, J. & Torrens, X. (Ed.) *Ideologías y movimientos políticos contemporáneos*. Madrid: Tecnos.
- Castells, M. (1997). *La era de la información. El poder de la identidad*. Madrid: Alianza.
- Cocker, H.L. and Cronin, J. (2017). "Charismatic authority and the YouTuber: Unpacking the new cults of personality", *Marketing Theory*, Vol 17, Nu 4, pp. 455-472. Doi: 10.1177/1470593117692022
- Del Águila, R. (2002). ¿De nuevo el fin de las ideologías? In Antón, J. *Las ideas políticas en el siglo XXI*. Madrid: Ariel.
- Del Campo, M.E. (2007). ¿Otra oportunidad para la política? Los grupos de presión y el segundo circuito de la política, *Temas para el Debate*, Vol 1, Nu 152, pp. 68-71.
- Dawkins, R. (1976). *El gen egoísta: Las bases egoístas de nuestra conducta*. Barcelona: Labor.
- Errejón, I. (2017). "Occidente en su momento populista", *Contexto y Acción*. Available in: <https://ctxt.es/es/20170419/Firmas/12306/populismo-izquierda-errejon-le-pen-trump.htm> [Consulted: 06/11/21]
- Fichte, J.G (1988) *Discursos de la nación alemana*. Madrid: Tecnos. Disponible en: <https://mercaba.es/britania/fichte.pdf> [Consultado el 22/03/21]
- Francis, S. (2005). "Race and the American Prospect: Essays on Racial Realities

- of Our Nation and Our Time”, *Los Angeles, The Occidental Press*.
- Giglioli, D. (2017). *Crítica de la víctima*. Barcelona: Herder Editorial.
- Griffin, R. (2000). “Interregnum or endgame? The radical right in the ‘post-fascist’ era”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol 5, Un 2, pp. 163-178, DOI: 10.1080/713682938
- Hawley, G. (2017). *Making Sense of the Alt-Right*. Nueva York: Columbia University Press.
- Hawley, G. (2019). *The Alt-Right: What Everyone Needs to know*. Oxford: OUP USA.
- Held, D. (1995). *La democracia y el orden global. Del Estado moderno al gobierno cosmopolita*. Barcelona: Paidós.
- Honderich, T. (1993). *El conservadurismo. Un análisis de la tradición anglosajona*. Barcelona: Península.
- Honneth, A. & Fraser, N. (2006). ¿Redistribución o reconocimiento? Un debate político-filosófico. Madrid: Morata.
- Honneth, A. (1997). *La lucha por el reconocimiento: Por una gramática moral de los conflictos sociales*. Barcelona: Crítica.
- Hume, D. (2005) *Tratado de la naturaleza humana*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
- Huntington, P. S. (2005). *El choque de civilizaciones y la reconfiguración del orden mundial*. Barcelona: Paidós.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture Shift. In Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kaiser, A. (2009). *La fatal ignorancia: La anorexia cultural de la derecha frente al avance ideológico progresista*. Santiago: Instituto Democracia y Mercado.
- Kaiser, A. (2017). *La tiranía de la igualdad: Por qué el igualitarismo es inmoral y socava el progreso de nuestra sociedad*. Barcelona: Deusto.
- Kaiser, A. (2020). *La neoinquisición: Persecución, censura y decadencia cultural del siglo XXI*. Barcelona: Deusto.
- Kallis, A. (2018). The Radical Right and Islamophobia in Jens Rydgren. *The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right*. New York: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.001.0001
- Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S. & Frey, T. (2006). “Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared”, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol 45, Nu 6, pp. 921-957
- Letamendia, F. (2013). *El hilo invisible: identidades políticas e ideologías*. Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco.
- Levy, J. T. (2000). *El multiculturalismo del miedo*. Madrid: Tecnos.
- Maiz, R. & Lois, M. (2020). “Posmodernismo”. In Antón, J. & Torrens, X. (Ed.) *Ideologías y movimientos políticos contemporáneos*. Madrid: Tecnos.
- Marcuse, H. (1981). *Eros y civilización*. Barcelona: Ariel.
- Márquez, N. & Laje, A. (2016). *El libro negro de la nueva izquierda: ideología de género o subversión cultural*. Madrid: Unión Editorial.
- Moldbug, M. (2009). *A Gentle Introduction to Unqualified Reservations*. San Francisco: Unqualified Reservations.
- Moreno del Río, C. (2020). “Antiglobalismo”. In Antón, J. & Torrens, X. (Ed.) *Ide-*

- ologías y movimientos políticos contemporáneos. Madrid: Tecnos.
- Nagle, A. (2017). *Kill All Normies. Online Culture Wars from 4Chan and Tumblr to Trump and the Alt-Right*. Londres: Zer0 Books.
- Nash, G. H. (1987). *La rebelión conservadora en EEUU*. Buenos Aires: Grupo editorial Latinoamericano.
- Nisbet, R. (1995). *Conservadurismo*. Madrid: Alianza.
- Oakeshott, M. (1991). *Rationalism in politics and other essays*. Indianapolis: Liberty press.
- Peterson, J. (2018). *12 Rules for life: An antidote to Chaos*. New York: Random House Canada.
- Raim, L. (2017). “La derecha «alternativa» que agita a Estados Unidos”, *Nueva sociedad*, Vol 1, Nu 267, pp. 53-71.
- Reguera, M. (2017). “Alt Right: radiografía de la extrema derecha del futuro”, *Ctxt*. Available in: <https://ctxt.es/es/20170222/Politica/11228/Movimiento-Alt-Right-EEUU-Ultraderecha-Marcos-Reguera.htm> [Consulted 06/01/21]
- Rivero, Á. (2020). “Liberalismo Conservador”. In Antón, J. & Torrens, X. (Ed.) *Ideologías y movimientos políticos contemporáneos*. Madrid: Tecnos.
- Rockwell, L. (2008). “La izquierda, la derecha y el Estado”, Libertadcarajo [Blog], 12-31-2008. Available in: <https://libertadcarajo.wordpress.com/2010/11/18/la-izquierda-la-derecha-y-el-estado/> [Consulted 04/01/22]
- Rothbard, M. (1973). *Hacia una nueva libertad: El manifiesto libertario*. Madrid: Unión Editorial.
- Royo, A. (2016). *Contra la nueva educación*. Barcelona: Plataforma editorial.
- Saralegui, M. (2016). *Carl Schmitt, pensador español*. Madrid: Trotta.
- Simón, M, A. (2020). “Nueva extrema derecha”. In Antón, J. & Torrens, X. (Ed.) *Ideologías y movimientos políticos contemporáneos*. Madrid: Tecnos.
- Sloterdijk, P. (2003). *Esferas I: Burbujas. Microsferología*. Madrid: Siruela.
- Schmitt, C. (1923). *La teoría política del mito*. Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión.
- Stanley, B (2008). “The thin ideology of populism”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol 13, Nu 1, pp. 95-118. Available in: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310701822289>
- Tarchi, M. (2002). “Radicalismo de derecha y neofascismo en la Europa de posguerra”. In Mellón, J., Gentile, E., Sánchez Cervelló, J., Griffin, R., Saz, I., Tarchi, M., Da Cal, E. & Vallbé Fernández. (Ed.) *Orden, jerarquía y comunidad: Fascismos, dictaduras y postfascismos en la Europa contemporánea*. Madrid: Tecnos.
- Tolson, A. (2010). “A new authenticity? Communicative practices on YouTube”, *Critical Discourse Studies*, Vol 7, Nu 4, pp. 277-289. Available in: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2010.511834>
- Torrens, X. (2020). “Racismo”. In Antón, J. & Torrens, X. (Ed.) *Ideologías y movimientos políticos contemporáneos*. Madrid: Tecnos.
- Villoro, L. (1998). *Estado plural, pluralidad de culturas*. Pachuca of Soto: Paidós.
- Weber, M. (2012). *La ética protestante y el espíritu del capitalismo*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Widmer, H. (1977). El darwinismo social: su valor como prueba de la ideologización de la conciencia, *Revista Sistema*, Vol 1. Un 21, pp. 49-67. Available in: <https://fundacionsistema.com/el-darwinismo-social-su-valor-como-prueba-de-la-ideologizacion-de-la-conciencia/>

Wright, E. (1997). *Class counts: comparative studies in class analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Zakaria, F. (1997). "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 1, Nu 76, pp. 22-43. Available in: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20048274>

Zanatta, L. (2014). *El populismo*. Buenos Aires: Katz.

Journalistic bibliography to confirm events

Ballesteros, R & Bocanegra, J. (2020). La fundación de Vox. "Dar la batalla cultural a la izquierda funciona y se traduce en votos". *El confidencial*, 12-11-2020. Available in: https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2020-11-12/fundacion-vox-batalla-cultural-izquierda-votos_2828336/

Brandt, T, Polumbo, B & Sanchez, D. (2020). La prohibición de Trump a la marxista teoría crítica de la raza, explicada. *PanamPost*, 16-9-2020. Available in: <https://panampost.com/fee-panampost/2020/09/16/la-prohibicion-de-trump-a-la-marxista-teoria-critica-de-la-raza-explicada/>

Editorial Política. (2019). Descubriendo al enemigo neomarxista. *El montonero*.

Available in: <https://elmontonero.pe/politica/descubriendo-al-enemigo-neomarxista>

Galaup, L. (2021). Cuando Vox definía como "estercoleros multiculturales" los barrios que ahora visita en campaña. *El Diario*, 11-4-2021. Available in: https://www.eldiario.es/madrid/vox-definia-estercoleros-multiculturales-barrios-ahora-visita-campana_1_7393590.html

Gottfried, P. (2014). What is Liberal Democracy? Exploring a Problematic Term. The Nomocracy Project. Recuperado en: <https://thenomocracyproject.wordpress.com/2014/04/16/what-is-liberal-democracy-exploring-a-problematic-term-by-paul-gottfried/>

Lorente, B. (2020). Salvini criticó al Papa por "abrir las puertas" a inmigrantes musulmanes. *Télam*, 2-1-2020. Available in: <https://www.telam.com.ar/notas/202001/420681-salvini-critico-al-papa-por-abrir-las-puertas-a-inmigrantes-musulmanes.html>

Rozas, R. (2020). Rocío de Meer (Vox) llama "estercoleros multiculturales" a los barrios humildes. *El plural*, 26-8-2020. Available in: https://www.elplural.com/comunicacion/protagonistas/rocio-meer-vox-llama-estercoleros-multiculturales-barrios-humildes_246803102

Foro cultura21. (2021). The Great Reset: Globalismo e ingeniería social. *Woman Essentia*, 23-7-2021. Available in: <https://www.womanessentia.com/punto-de-vista/opinamos/the-great-reset-globalismo-e-ingenieria-social/>