International Organizations and the Theory of Clubs

Authors

  • José Andrés Faíña Medín Departamento de Análisis Económico y Administración de Empresas Universidade da Coruña
  • Antonio García Lorenzo Departamento de Análisis Económico y Administración de Empresas Universidade da Coruña
  • Jesús López-Rodríguez Departamento de Anáisis Económico y Administración de Empresas Universidade da Coruña

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.46661/revmetodoscuanteconempresa.2146

Keywords:

Theory of Clubs, international economic organizations, benefits and costs of the governments' choices, Teoría de los Clubes, organizaciones económicas internacionales, beneficio y costes de las elecciones de los gobiernos

Abstract

This paper focuses on international organizations, especially those regulating trade and exchange. It draws on the Theory of Clubs (Buchanan, 1965) and builds a model that aims to explain governments' optimal choices when joining international organizations. The results of the model show that governmental willingness to enlarge international organizations and to increase their degree of commitment are decreasing functions of both, the size of the organization, and the country's degree of commitment and of national heterogeneity.

 

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References

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Published

2016-11-04

How to Cite

Faíña Medín, J. A., García Lorenzo, A., & López-Rodríguez, J. (2016). International Organizations and the Theory of Clubs . Journal of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, 9, Páginas 17 a 27. https://doi.org/10.46661/revmetodoscuanteconempresa.2146

Issue

Vol. 9 (2010)

Section

Articles

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Copyright (c) 2010 Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa

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