Crisis financiera y regulación de la solvencia bancaria
Una revisión crítica sobre los acuerdos de Basilea
Palabras clave:
regulación bancaria, Comité de Basilea, adecuación del capitalResumen
El objetivo de este artículo es doble. Por una parte, presentar las líneas maestras y la evolución de la regulación bancaria durante los últimos tiempos, con especial atención a las propuestas del Comité de Supervisión Bancaria de Basilea en relación con la adecuación del capital o recursos propios de las entidades de crédito. Por otro lado, ofrecer un debate y análisis crítico acerca de tales propuestas, resaltando sus limitaciones y sus efectos en el desarrollo de la Gran Recesión iniciada en 2007, sin olvidar efectuar un breve repaso de las recientes medidas adoptadas por el mencionado Comité en diciembre de 2010. La regulación bancaria mantiene su importancia para asegurar la estabilidad financiera; e incluso parece más necesaria que nunca, a la vista de los mayores o nuevos riesgos derivados del sobreendeudamiento, la volatilidad y las innovaciones. Muy en concreto, el control prudencial mediante la vigilancia del capital puede contribuir a reforzar la solvencia bancaria. Sin embargo, los métodos aplicados para evaluar y cubrir los riesgos asumidos muestran una fragilidad llamativa. Por tanto, las recomendaciones de ese Comité, extensas y muy complejas en sus detalles técnicos, suscitan numerosos interrogantes. ¿No habríamos de ir un poco más allá de ellas?
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