Towards a new architecture for progressive international capital taxation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.46661/rec.10712Abstract
The application and operation of the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules agreed at the OECD and released in December 2021 have both strengths and weaknesses for developing countries. Now is the time to address directly the multilateral institutional "architecture" in relation to international tax negotiations. Despite the current geopolitical tensions, the nature of climate change and increased possibility of future health pandemics have made the need for global public goods provision – and thus global tax coordination – even more necessary. Moreover, the GloBe rules reflect the underrepresentation of non-OECD members in the process of the "Inclusive Framework," as evidenced by their absence in key committee leadership, paucity of specialised delegates and lack of explicit voting rights. Therefore, it is correct to welcome the recent UN resolution to work towards a worldwide Tax Convention.
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