Three problems for the Habermas´ democracy conception

Authors

  • Horacio Spector Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Argentina

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.46661/revintpensampolit.1882

Keywords:

Habermas, discourse, ethics, communication, deliberative democracy

Abstract

Habermas’ discourse theory is ethically premised on the notion of consensus. This work aims at overcoming the practical and theoretical limitations for which it has been criticized. Because deliberative democracy, on which the Habermasian discourse is concretized, is more legitimate than liberal democracy, its supporters must engage in this task. I argue that the limitations of Habermas’ discourse theory - the discursive incommensurability, the discursive dilemma and the discursive flaw - could be overcome. Yet, even if these limitations could not be completely corrected, deliberative democracy remains the best available political model.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

BRENNAN, Geoffrey (2001), «Collective Coherence?», 21(2) International Review of Law and Economics.

CAMERER, Colin et al. (2003), «Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and The Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism’», University of Pennsylvania Law Review.

CAPLAN, Bryan (2007), The Myth of the Rational Voter, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

CAPLAN, Bryan (2009), «Majorities Against Utility: Implications of the Failure of the Miracle of Aggregation», Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 26, No. 1.

COSSIO, Carlos (1945), El Derecho en el Derecho Judicial, Buenos Aires, Guillermo Kraft.

CROWDER, George (2002), Liberalism & Value Pluralism, London and New York, Continuum.

CHAPMAN, Bruce (1998), «More Easily Done than Said: Rules, Reason and Rational Social Choice», 18(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies.

DOWNS, Anthony (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York, Harper.

ELSTER, Jon (1986), «The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory», en Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland (comps.), Foundations of Social Choice Theory, New York: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme.

FARRELL, Martín (2003), «La argumentación de las decisiones en los tribunales colectivos», La Ley, F, 1161.

FEYERABEND, Paul K. (1962), «Explanation, Reduction and Empiricism», en H. Feigl y G. Maxwell (comps.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

HABERMAS, Jürgen (1973), Problemas de legitimación en el capitalismo tardío, trad. José Luis Etcheverry, Buenos Aires, Amorrortu.

HABERMAS, Jürgen (1991), Conciencia moral y acción comunicativa, trad. Ramón García Cotarelo, Barcelona, Península.

HABERMAS, Jürgen (1998), Facticidad y validez, trad. Manuel Jiménez Redondo, Madrid, Trotta.

HABERMAS, Jürgen (1996), «Paradigms of Law», 17 Cardozo Law Review.

HABERMAS, Jürgen (2002), Verdad y justificación, trad. Pere Fabra y Luis Díez, Madrid, Trotta.

HARDIN, Russell (1999), «Constitutionalism: Contract or Coordination?», in Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

IHERING, Rudolf von (1865), Geist des Römischen Rechts auf den Verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung, Leipzig, Breitkopf & Härtel.

JACKSON, Franck y PETTIT, Philip (1995), «Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation», The Philosophical Quarterly 45.

JOLLS, Christine et al (1998)., «A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics», 50 Stanford Law Review 1471.

KOROBKIN, Russell B. y ULEN, Thomas S. (2000), «Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics», 88 California Law Review 1951.

KUHN, Thomas (2000), The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays 19701993, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

KORNHAUSER, Lewis A. y SAGER, Lawrence G. (1986), «Unpacking the Court», 96 Yale Law Journal.

Lawrence G. (1993), «The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts», 81 California Law Review.

LAFONT, Cristina (1993), La razón como lenguaje, Una revisión del ‘giro lingüístico’ en la filosofía del lenguaje alemana, Madrid, Visor.

LAFONT, Cristina y PEÑA, Lorenzo (1999), «La tradición humboldtiana y el relativismo lingüístico», en Marcelo Dascal (comp.), Enciclopedia Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Vol. 18, Madrid: Trotta.

LAFONT, Cristina (2006), «Is the Ideal of a Deliberative Democracy Coherent?», in S. Besson and J.L. Martí (eds.), Deliberative Democracy and its Discontents, Aldershot, Ashgate.

LIST, Christian (2006), «The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason», Ethics 116 (2). pp. 362-402.

MACINTYRE, Alasdair (1984), After Virtue, 2nd Edition, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press.

MACKIE, Gerry (2007), Review of Guido Pincione y Fernando R. Tesón, Rational Choice and Democratic Deliberation, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, disponible en: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=11143.

NINO, Carlos Santiago (1996), The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy, New Haven, Conn., Yale Univ. Press.

ORWELL, George (1979), «Politics and the English Language», in The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, comp. por Sonia Orwell y Ian Angus, Vol. 4, London, Penguin Books.

PECZENIK, Aleksander y SPECTOR, Horacio (1987), «A Theory of Moral Ought-Sentences», Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie 73.

PETTIT, Philip (2001), «Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma,» 11 Philosophical Issues.

PETTIT, Philip (2003), «Deliberative Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma, and Republican Theory», in James Fishkin y Peter Laslett (comps.), Philosophy, Politics and Society, Vol. 7, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

PINCIONE, Guido y TESON, Fernando (2006), Rational Choice and Democratic Deliberation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

ROSS, Alf (1957), «Tû-Tû», Harvard Law Review 70.

SARTOR, Giovanni (2008), «Legal Concepts: An Inferential Approach», EUI Working Papers Law 3.

SCHEFFLER, Israel (1967), Science and Subjectivity, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill.

SCHUMPETER, Joseph (1971), Capitalismo, Socialismo y Democracia, trad. José Díaz García, Buenos Aires, Aguilar.

SOMIN, Ilya (1998), «Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal», Critical Review, Vol. 12, No. 4.

SOMIN, Ilya (2010), «Political Ignorance and Deliberative Democracy», Critical Review.

SUNSTEIN, Cass (1997), «Behavioral Analysis of Law», University of Chicago Law Review.

SUNSTEIN, Cass R. y TAHLER, Richard H. (2003), «Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron», 70 University of Chicago Law Review.

VACCA, Roberto (1921), «Opinioni individuali e Deliberazioni collettive», Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto I.

WEDGWOOD, Ralph (2001), «Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms», The Philosophical Review 110.

WILLIAMS, Bernard (1985), Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.

WITTMAN, Donald (1995), The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions Are Efficient, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Published

2016-03-17

How to Cite

Spector, H. (2016). Three problems for the Habermas´ democracy conception. International Journal of Political Thought, 6, 435–460. https://doi.org/10.46661/revintpensampolit.1882

Issue

Section

Estudios Varios