Equilibrium in an oligopoly market with a dominant firm in the payment card market
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.46661/revmetodoscuanteconempresa.5567Keywords:
vertical integration, two-sided market, market powerAbstract
The main aim of this research is to measure the variation of market power exercised by a vertically integrated firm in the market of transactions carried out through payment cards, because of changes given by the entry of competitive firms in the market of purchasing shops, which increase the level of downstream competition in the industry. To achieve this, it is used as a model based on an oligopolistic structure where there is a leading firm and a fringe of competitive firms that compete each other, based on Stackelberg competition. The econometric model estimates indirectly the residual elasticity demand for the period January 2013-May 2020. As a result, the market power is directly related to the market share of the leading firm, equivalent to 1.14% to 114.35%, being the last predominant value in the trading account.
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