Dogmatic analysis of the “do no significant harm” (DNSH) principle in the European legal order: challenges of a cross-cutting criterion

Abstract

The article situates the “Do No Significant Harm” (DNSH) principle within the European Green Deal and the EU’s financial-regulatory architecture, underscoring its evolution from sustainable finance to public expenditure (via the Recovery and Resilience Facility) as a technical exclusion standard that conditions the ex ante eligibility of measures and, potentially, reshapes administrative procedures and oversight in a multilevel-governance perspective. This research pursues a dual objective. First, it offers a dogmatic reconstruction of DNSH—its nature, scope, function, and limits—allowing comparison with classical legal categories. Second, it brings to light the constitutional and public-policy implications of DNSH in the EU, with particular attention to regulatory developments and the open question of whether the many (and potentially contradictory) ambiguities and contradictions of the legislative text constrain administrative discretion or, rather, encourage it; as well as to the impact of the high degree of technification in administrative decision-making on the accountability landscape. The article adopts a qualitative methodological approach, predominantly legal-dogmatic, while also incorporating occasional European-governance and constructivist considerations more typical of the social sciences.